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PREFACE
The Business Management for Economic Development Project documents
cases of sincere attempts, whether successful or not, to achieve a level
of external contributions to the general development of the host economy
optimal to the internal benefits a business must have to succeed in a
developing society. Internal benefits are those that accrue to the firm
only, and external contributions are benefits to other parties. Examples
of business activity that might combine internal and external benefits
include 1)spreading technical knowledge and innovation, 2) creating
commercial linkages that promote new business development and/or struc-
tural improvement in the economy, 3) generating foreign exchange earn-
ings or savings, 4) creating local employment, 5) creating local manage-
ment capability, 6) contributing to greater income equality, 7) facili-
tating credit formation and saving in the host economy, 8) promoting
products and projects that meet the development priorities of the host
government, 9) reducing to a minimum the local external costs of company
operations. Local conditions will determine which of these activities
should have the highest priority.
We look to several organizational settings for relevant examples:
indigenous businesses, subsidiaries of international businesses, para-
statal agencies that own or promote business operations, and of course,
public policy-making agencies.
These studies should be most useful to management training programs
for people who will operate in underdeveloped economies, whether they be
"Third World" countries, or dependent and lagging sectors of industrial
societies. Directors and instructors of management programs in under-
developed areas, as well as government officials and some business lead-
ers, have indicated a need to train management personnel to be more sen-
sitive to the economic development needs and opportunities of the host en-
vironment. An expansive view of management education, that includes a
concern for the external effects of business operations,might reinforce
the commitment of individuals and enterprises to promote economic develop-
ment on a general basis, and might facilitate public policy-making and ad-
ministrative effectiveness on the part of those who have to define and de-
fend the national interests with respect to both the domestic and inter-
national business sectors.
I wish to acknowledge my gratitude for the financial support which
has been rendered to the project by the Technology Adaptation Project, the
International Business Project, the Center for International Studies and
the Department of Political Science, all at M.I.T., the African American
Scholar's Council of Washington, D.C., and the Ford Foundation of New York.
The Rockfeller Foundation has supported my work on African Arab Cooperation.
Willard R. Johnson M.I.T.
Principal Investigator
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Introduction
Once it was thought sufficient to call th-e developed countries
rich. Now, it has widely come to be recognized that financial wealth
and development are distinct phenomenah. It is appreciated that gen-
uine development entails the expansion of a country's capacity to
increase its productivity from factors of production that are under
its own control. Selling oil or other finite extractive resources
even for high prices, or economic assistance even under terms of
Arab generosity, or borrowed capacities from the most advanced
transnational corporations, or windfall resources, or playing host
to someone else's productivity, cannot be the basis of real economic
development. At best such things can only help a country get start-
ed or move faster. Ultimately, real development is, to some extent,
self reliant development.
Thus, how a country carries out its development program may be
as important as'whAt is contained in it. Whether it involves forest-
ation or administration, or whether it promotes health or harvest,
where there are local resources they should be used, or they will
disappear. If a, conscious effort is not made to promote the use of
local enterprise,national organizations, indigenous technicians and
managersrthey will not come into being. After billions of dollars
2will have been spent to build roads and bridges, schools and
offices, ports -and railways, and what not, Africa will still be
lacking road builders, construction companies, technical experts,
and people with the managerial know-how to keep development going
and make it serve local needs and interests.
All this seems to be terribly obvious, but it is the most
neglected aspect not only of the development promoted by African-
Arab Cooperation, but by almost all the other development promotion
operations going on in Africa, and for that matter, in much of the
Arab world as well. As we are presently proceeding, the African and
Arab elites are likely to perpetuate the dependency and underde-
velopment that now characterizes their economies, and their descend-
ent peoples throughout the world will continue to find themselves
exposed to abuse.
The political and technical elites are taking the easy way
out. They are all going on commission in showpiece partnerships
while the real technical work and the experience belongs to those
who come from the already developed world. After another ten or
twenty years of thisAfrica and the Arab world will have a well
entrenched aristocracy of leisured figureheads, with foreign peo-
ple and institutions providing the only assurance of sustainable
productivity, and all the university graduates clamoring for gua-
-ranteed jobs in either statal, parastatal or even private bureau-
cracies. By then the debt burdens of the "Third World" (there will
no longer be any pretense at calling it a "developing".world) will
bind the underclasses to a low grade existence without realistic
hope of- eventual relief. Grand opportunities will have been lost.
What Use Is Now Being Made of Local Enterprise?
Virtually none.
The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa has committed
$283m to thirtynine development projects in Africa. Other Arab
sources have committed an additional $100m to these same projects,
and the rest of the internationa1fdevelopment-assistance community
will put in at least an additional $930m to help co-finance them.
And, as a result of the expenditure of all that money, unless there
is a change from the pattern of project implementation that has ex-
isted until now, not a single African enterprise will have been
created, expanded or made more competitive as a result.
Whose fault is this? Both the donors and the recipients. This
is a point to which I will return. For now it is important to note
only that the existing pattern is not warranted. Twentyseven of
these projects involve rather large scale and complex operations,
but have some functions that existing African enterprises and or-
ganizations are competent to perform, at least to some degree. The
remaining twelve projects seem amenable to being completely imple-
mented by local agencies. But to date, despite a late and falter-
ing effort and one or two near-connects, the ABEDA has yet to use
an African firm-.+ The first two ABEDA financed projects that will
utilize even a regional firm or expert in charge have been approved
only very recently, in late 1978, and are both located in devastat-
-ed Uganda. A textile mill will be implemented by an Egyptian firm
and an Arab agronomist will head a poultry project.
It does not disparage the significant contributions of the
Arab Technical Assistance Fund to point out that substituting Arab
experts for European or American ones does not advance African de-
velopment as we are defining it here. Opportunities to expand
existing resources or to help create them are being missed.
We should clearly note that the ABEDA is not alone in this
failure. The African Development Bank had almost as dismal a
record in implementing the first onehundredten of its projects.
When I examined that record in 1976, and perhaps it has not chang-
ed since that time, I found that only six of the twentytwo firms
on its roster(of over two hundred)that seemed to be African owned
had received any contract. Only one had a contract in the imple-
mentation phase. The other five were involved in pre-investment
feasibility studies and the like. None of these six contracts had
been awarded before 1975, eight years after it began its investment
operations.
The record is also alarmingly poor among the development or-
iented institutions and programs that are associated with the United
Nations. A study done in 1976 by the UNDP concerning Technical
Cooperation Among Developing Countries revealed that among the near-
ly fivethousand firms and institutions that are on the rosters
of approved bidders for contracts from the major UNDP financed
agencies only threehundrednineteen were from developing countries.
Of these only twentynine had actually received any contract, even
on a no-bid basis (with a collective value of only $lm) and only
four (perhaps included among the twentynine) had won competitive
bids (for a value of only about $.5m).
All these are capital sources that are controlled by the
countries of the Third World.
*UNDP Doc DP/229. 19 Nov. 1976. J.G. Odero-Jowi Senior Consultant.
"Technical Co-Operation Among Developing Countries"
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Any one of a complex mix of factors could produce this result. The
factors are of three types: 1) psychological, 2) procedural, and
3) realistic.
1. Psychological: This is the least important of the types of
factors involved, but important nonetheless. Both the donors and
the recipients are conditioned to believe that the human and organ-
izational resources needed to implement their development projects
competently, efficiently,and quickly,do not exist locally or with-
in the broader region.
Their bias is not one of placing no value, philosophically,
on using and/or building up local resources. Indeed, the common
African and Arab experience of external intrusion, expl6itation
and humiliation conditions them to think in similar terms about
once again becoming the subjects of their own history. However,
the political elites and even the technocratic officials of the
development agencies tend to share a number of ties to the develop-
ed world, and share also a number of very basic beliefs that work
to disadvantage local enterprises and to favor ones from the in-
dustrialized world; they believe that the international companies
are all highly competent, that these companies will assign only
highly competent and experienced personnel to their projects, that
such African companies and technically trained people as exist
are inexperienced, that a very high level of formalized education
and training is crucial to successfully doing the tasks involv-
ed, and that if the qualified people and companies existed locally
or within the region, these officials would already know about them.
K)
When I have asked officials of these lending institutions
why they fail -to award more contracts to local experts and insti-
tutions, after proclaiming the non-existance of such resources
they often talk about the colonial complex that made Africans
and other ex-colonized people have little faith in their own in-
stitutions. ABEDA officials have even stated to me that despite the
great row that was made about the Arabs not distributing their
funds through the African Development Bank, many delegations of
African officials express to them a preference that the funds not
go through the ADB,which they'claim is too slow, too inefficient,
and too politicized.
An official of the Arab League mentioned to me that there are
strong sentiments among Arab as well as African leaders to regain
control over their own resources. They remember the colonial
period. But they have little confidence in the small institutions
that exist at the national level. Perhaps the Arab states should
take a lesson from Mohammed Ali, he said, who made many moderniz-
ing innovations and achieved enough power to alter the world bal-
ance. He acquired advancedtechnology by hiring individual techno-
logists, not whole organizations.
Officials of the African Development Bank, like those at
ABEDAhave spoken to me about "an inferiority complex" that still
influences too many decisions.
Dr. Ayari, President of ABEDA, has also expressed concerns
about the attitudes and perspectives that dominate African develop-
ment programs, and perhaps also his own institution, which may be
retarding progress toward genuine development, but he relates this
more to the types of projects that are supported rather than
the way they are implemented. "There is no innovation, whatsoever,"
he has stated to me, "we are reproducing the system, only applying
what we learned in the (Western) universities.. .the elite with whom
we are talking in Africa today, they come from the same sources,
with the same education." This orientation leads them to emphasize
cement factories and the like, complains Ayari, and "from the donors
to the receivers, all of us are biased by what we consider as the
mode of consumption today...the one idea is to look like a North
American city or a European city. This is a worldwide fact. It
is wrong, but it is a fact."
2. The Procedural Factors: The way in which not only the Arab
and the African, but most international financing institutions
operate makes it difficult to utilize local institutions and ex-
perts on any grand scale. The most important aspect of this is
the insistence on "arms-length" relationships with the project
implementers. It is rare that capital sources other than the
transnational companies themselves provide direct management
or ot'her technical services during the implementation phase.At
that point they emphasize monitoring and evaluation almost ex-
clusively. The contracts to implement the projects are awarded
through international competitive bidding. The procedures used
to certify the bidders never involve any outreach effort to iden-
.tify and certainly not to help create qualified competitors from
the developing world. The lists of firms approved by the World
Bank, or the Caisse Centrale, or U.S.A.I.D. or even Chase Manhat-
tan Bank are the same as for the UNDP, the ADB or the ABEDA.
8The preference to invest only in projects and not in more
general development programs may also bias the implementation
operations against local firms. Program support would presumably
allow more flexibility in carrying out the program. It is clear
from the documented experience of the UNDP financed programs that
local contractors from developing countries will get almost all
of their contracts through non-competitive bidding, if they get
them at all. In any case their share of the market has been quite
small--less than 5%.
It is noteworthy that the UNDP study concluded that "the great-
est single obstacle to the formation and growth of consultancy ser-
vices in developing countries is probably the irregular and in-
sufficient volume of demand." It is precisely the demand side
of the picture that the lending agencies such as the ABEDA, ADB
and UNDP systems can influence with the least amount of interference
by the industrialized world.
I.wish to quote another passage from the UNDP report because
it reveals what is both a cause and a result of the limited oppor-
tunities for contractors in the developing countries:
(Para.152) The international organizations normally use either
rosters...or directories of consulting organizations published
by professional associations or private firms to prepare a
"long list",pf firms which may provide the type of consultancy
services required for a specific assignment. Published direct-
ories are usually available for consulting organizations in de-
veloped countries. A roster of consulting organizations is the
only means, for practical purposes, of identifying consultancy
services in developing countries. (Para 153) The data available
from seven agencies indicate that consulting organizations
from developing countries account for only 6.6 per cent of a
total of 4,840 consulting organizations on the roster.. .The im-
portance of being on the roster is far more important for a con-
sulting organization of a developing country than for individual
experts or training institutions...No conscious and systematic
efforts have yet been made to identify consulting organizations
in developing countries by major international organizations."
9I can add my personal experience to the evidence that the
major internati-onal development finance organizations, including
those controlled by Arabs and by Africans, have not seriously at-
tempted to use local engineering and other consulting firms. I
personally inquired in the libraries of the World Bank, the U.N.
and the U.N.D.P. for directories and other listings of African and
Arab enterprises and organizations that might be relevant for the
implementation functions of projects supported by these insitutions.
At the World Bank there was the usual array of directors of Ameri-
can firms, and the Bottin directory of French firms. One would
find no trouble in getting information about British firms, and
there was even the 1966 Egyptian Stock Exchange Yearbook and a
few Commercial Directories of other Middle Eastern countries. But
for non-Arab Africa only the telephone and a few chamber of commerce
annuals. These also give more information on European firms in
Africa than local ones. The French language sources were more
numerous than the English ones, and contain titles such as: "Afri-
que Industrie : Ficher industriel de l'Afrique noire," or "Annuaire
des entreprises et organismes d'outre-mer," or "Societes et four-
nisseurs de l'Afrique noire," or "Les 500 premieres societes
d'Afrique noire," but if you look inside these directories you
find only information about French firms with but few exceptions.
Firms I know about are not there. Even for a country like Algeria,
despite the socialist character of its economy, there are local
firms which go neglected in the Annuaire.
The situation at the United Nations is worse. Few of the
directories I found at the World Bank are there. There was-
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a directory of directories at the U.N. Center on Transnational
Corporations. In this bibliography of directories one discovers
that there is a Kenyan Registry of Manufacturing Firms, or a Trade
and Commercial Index for East and Central Africa. But you will not
find the registry or the index itself.
The United Nations has recognized the need for technical co-
operation among developing countries, of course, and sponsored the
conference in Argentina on that subject. But the Directory of Ser-
vices prepared for that conference itself reveals something of the
problem--lack of' seriousness about the issue not only by the confer-
ence organizers but the participating governments as well. The
questionnaires that were sent around from which to develop the
directory were filled out by some ministry mid- to low-ranking
official who gave minimal attention to it. One can judge this
from the results. For Nigeria, to take one important example,
there are only two listings as sources of technical services--
Ahmadou Bello University (not even the several other universities
that would be relevant, such as Ibadan, Nsukka or Lagos) and the
- Center for Management Development at Lagos (not even the one at
Ibadan.) Nothing about the hundreds of businesses that would be
relevant, and nothing about even how to make contact with the
thousands of individuals who could provide services.
Nothing in these libraries would tell the inquirer anything
about the capital structure, the amount of assets, the experience,
the principal owners and staff of any of the private businesses,
or even the major statal and parastal organizations in the African
countries.
. 4.
If' an American company wants to do business abroad, it
can inquire with the U.S. Department of Commerce and receive
more information on Nigerian firms, importing agents, suppliers,
potential partners, whatever, than you can find at the ADB or the
ABEDA. Perhaps for a starter these institutions should make a
formal request for a copy of the information oui such firms and
people that is readily available to an American businessman.
3) Factors of Realism: The objective reality is that the charact-
er of the development programe being supported by the Arab and Afri-
can institutions do not favor local organizations. Despite the
lack of any overall development plan for the region or its sub-re-
gions, the bulk of investment has gone into essentially infrastruct-
ural and industrial projects of a rather large scale. Cumulatively,
the ABEDA has devoted about threefourths of its loans to projects
that are explicitly of this nature, and even some of the projects
in the agricultural sector involve some infrstructure work, such
as fishing port developments and pumping stations for polder pro-
jects, etc. These types of projects favor large, established firms,
especially if the project is carried out as a whole or in very
large comiponent parts by a single organization.
Much the same picture can be seen in the experience of the
African Development Bank. I examined the first onehundredten
projects in 1976 and found that the bulk involved projects that
relate to public utilities, such as power and telecommunications,
and transport and other basic facilities. Many of these projects
were supervised by government ministries, but all of them, with but
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one exception was implemented by non-African firms. Five contracts
had been awarded to African firms or individuals for pre-investment
functions.
It is not clear that any existing African firm could have han-
dled any of the public utility or transport projects in their en-
tirety. The one contract awarded to an African firm went to a
Senegalese road builder who may have been given only a portion of
the whole project. It does seem likely that there are a number of
African firms that can handle portions of road projects, or the
installation of telephone and'power lines. African firms have
probably performed some of the functions in each of the following
type of projects which the ADB had already supported by 1976: tim-
ber processing and marketing, i'nstallation of power and telecommu-
nication lines, the digging and widening of canals, paper milling
and marketing, textile plants, tourist development programs,etc.
A number of agricultural projects might have been handled entirely
by African organizations, subh as feedlot development, horticultur-
al projects etc. There were a number of projects in the ADB pipe-
line in 1976 that would also seem to be amenable to African contracts-
projects such as: dairy farming and processing; horticultural opera-
tions; field and processing operations for cocoa, cotton, sugar,
rice, palm, maize, salt; and various irrigation schemes.
This situation is not something the officials of these institu-
tions are not aware of. Dr. Ayari, for example, told me in Nov.
of 1978: "I fully agree with you that we have not been endeavoring
at all in seeing what the African expertise can offer us. Probably
not that much; I dont want to exaggrate the actual status of Afri-
can expertise in certain sophisticated areas of production. But,
nevertheless, you have medium size corporations and enterprises
in Africa today who would like to try to act. I for one am ready,
totally ready, but somebody has to push us, for sure, to build up
a list of African contractors in all fields.. .They will have to be
among the best. .. I am not asking them to be better than the Germans
or the Americans...but deliver good services, seriously managed...
there is no reason I shouldn't do it." He felt that a number of
countries already offered a reasonably developed market for finding
such capabilities, but he also asked a crucial question which I
in turn pass on: "Why should.. .an Arab banker have to go fetch
in Africa? Why are the Africans not coming to us themselves?"
What Evidence Is There That African Enterprises Can Be Created If
They Do Not Already Exist?
Most of the functions of the independent African governments
are run by Africans. So too are the operations of the regional,
sub-regional and national development banks. The same is true
for the Arab states, the Arab League(s) and the various investing
and banking institutuions that Arab states have fairly recently
established. But it was the established wisdom of the colonial
administrations that neither Africans nor even Arabs were ready
to handle these- functions when the colonial governments were forced
to relinquish their control.
Nothing in the prevailing assumptions of the Western world
prepared one to believe that Egyptians could operate the Suez
Canal, Algerians could establish and successfully operate SONATRACH,
that Kuwaitis could establish a Development Fund that would match
the competence of the World Bank, or that Nigerians could run
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a Nigerian Petroleum Company, or that Tanzanians could run a
Tanzanian National Insurance Company or National Development
Corporation. The prevailing opinion in the United States is still
that Afro-Americans are not ready to participate in foreign policy
debates. None of these things would have happened if the pace had
not been forced.
International businesses operating in Africa have also had to
be forced to bring Africans into more senior and managerial posi-
tions. But they did so when it became evident that continued access
to these countries required it, although, to be sure, there were
and are still a lot of "window dressing" appointments to high level
positions that have virtually no responsibility. In general, the
pattern of indigenization has started with the positions dealing
with personnel relations or public relations, and come last of all
to control financial functions. But the point is that most of the
Africans who have been put into positions of real responsibility
were thought by the international businesses in. question to be fiot
yet ready for it. Yet the performance has been good. Some train-
ing and preparation is necessary, of course, but the important pre-
paration is actually doing the job.
The Business Management for Economic Development Project which
I direct at M.I.T. has made a number of studies of African business
1.
and management development. Our study of management development
in Kenya found-that Africans made rapid progress where the deter-
mination existed that they should do so. Until the period of the
mid-1960s, for example, almost all the clerks in Kenyan banks
were Asians. It was said that Africans did not have the mentality
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for this rather simple function, but one crucial to the success
of banks. But pressures for African advancement convinced both
the. government and the banks that Asians should not be given a
monopoly on these functions, and Africans were found to be able
to perform them well. African advancement in the banks then went
ahead. Barclays had already operated a training school in Nairobi
which it then expanded to accomodate African candidates. The
National Grindlays Bank aggressively brought in African Junior
Management Cadets through a collaboration with the local high
schools.
Africans moved ahead in other business sectors as well. The
Mombasa Oil Refinery attained full Kenyanization at the on-site
supervisory levels within a short period of time. Kenya had ac-
quired control through nationalizing some of the holding of Cal-
Tex, Shell-BP and Esso. The General Manager remained expatriate
for some time, but he saw fit to declare that the Kenyan take-
over had been "very cordial" and that those "who actually run the
refinery are all Africans. They could blow up the place! But,
they are competent."
We found that the career paths of Kenyan senior managers,
those holding the top positions of General Manager, Managing Direct-
or or Departmental Heads, could learn to handle these responsbili-
ties as quickly as expatriatesfif not more quickly. These people
were only slightly olderthan the junior level managers--40 years
instead of 35, on the average. This tends to be about ten years
younger than their expatriate counterparts and than simil'ar African
managers in other parts of Africa,such as Nigeria. All the Africans
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in our Kenyan study were the first generation of their families
to occupy such.positions. Almost all had been to university but
had not necessarily trained for a business career. Generally,
Africans have acquired their managerial experience in government
administration which does not always or even often impart entre-
prenurial instincts. Some countries are more noted than others
for the natural entreprenurial orientations of their populations,
and Kenya, like Nigeria, is one of these.
Kenyan experience also exhibits some of the problems of the
"colonial complex" we have already mentioned. The KENATCO, for
example, was started by Kenyan drivers in a cooperative effort,
with financial support from the parastatal Industrial and Commerc-
ial Development Corporation, bu't it brought in expatriate manage-
ment under which the company floundered. Subsequently its top
management was Kenyanized and it prospered. The Kenyan General
Manager told us, "these expatriates were rejects from other firms."
He, and other African managerssharply criticized the training
programs that the international firms established. "You get an
expatriate who never tells his junior anything. Expatriates could-
n't care less. They left you to survive or perish." Under the
Kenyan manager of KENATCO a vigorous training program was success-
ful.
- Another firm which demonstrates the possibility of bringing
in'African managers at a rapid pace is the Bata Shoe Company which
is noted throughout Africa, indeed much of the developing world,
for being one of the real leaders in indigenizing their operations.
This company essentially trained its managers and wholesale opera-
tors on the job.
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The study African Businessmen by Marris and Somerset
published in 1965 about Kenyan businessmen also indicates that
formal business or even other formal schooling is not absolutely
necessary for business success.2 These were rather small businesses
and craftsmen. But about a third of those businessmen who had no
training were running successful operations-. About a third of those
whose training had been for some other business or career were
also able to make a success of their business. This proportion,
about a third, also held up for those running industrial type
operations who had no training.
A study of African entrepreneurship throughout the continent
published in 1971 by the World Bank did note that there was little
evidence that small scale artisinal entrepreneurs develop into
larger industrial operations, even in this respect there is some
hope: "...one can find almost everywhere African business-
men who have started with extremely modest means and
have managed, largely by dint of their own efforts,to
develop enterprises which, though small in absolute
sense, are still rather impressive by comparison with
their modest beginnings. Undoubtedly the percentage
of Africans already engaged in business that have a real
capacity for development into entrepreneurs capable of
operating on a larger scale and in accordance with more
modern methods is very small. If effective programs for
promoting African private enterprise are to be developed,
the necessary means for singling out the relatively
small percentage of businessmen capable of development
must be found." 3.
This study noted that in Nigeria a survey done in 1965 showed
that in Lagos alone there were nearly threehundred locally owned
firms that employed over ten people, twentytwo that employed over
onehundred workers, and sixty that had capital assets over LN20th.
The educational level of this group of businessmen was quite low--
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only about 40% had any education at or beyond the secondary level.
The firms concentrated in sawmilling,furniture making, printing,
garment making, rubber processing and the like.
Nigerians are also very active in con.struction. There are
said to be thousands of contractors in the federal, state and
local registers; and in the Norther Region alone, which has been
one of the less developed regions of the couitry, there were
eleven construction firms that could carry out contracts of
over EN 25,000. Six Nigerian contractors had turnover of between
L500,000 and LN 2m. In the city of Ibadan the author of the World
Bank study found two contractors that had employed as many as
3,000 workers at one time. The,se were firms clearly able to
undertake road and bridge construction.
None of these firms have made entry into the registries that
are used by the development finance institutions of concern to
uS.
What Is To Be Done?
Those genuinely interested in promoting the developihent
of Africa will have to undertake and promote the undertaking of
strenuous efforts to locate and perhaps to create indigenous in-
stitutions that can carry out all phases of development projects.
One needed step in this direction would be to compile a list
of existing enterprises that could be useful in performing the
functions of development projects. This will not be something
that can be accomplished quickly because the basic data is not
easily accessible even at the local level but a start can be made.
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A more far reaching, but more immediately possible activity
would be for the development finance institutions to themselves
help to bring into being one or more general-management-service
firms that could be an umbrella organization to group subcontractors,
to attract trained managers and technicians from the international
firms and from government posts where their skills may not be fully
utilized. This is a proposal I have made to the African Develop-
ment Bank and to the East African Development Bank, and it should
be made to the ABEDA as well. Help to launch an African owned
firm of this type! The starting point may be to host a conferenc-
of existing construction, engineering, manufacturing and other
related African owned firms in order to communicate to them the
market possibilities and to assess the opportunity to federate
some of them into production units of larger capacity and territor-
ial scope.
The organizational form of a general-management-services firm
could vary consideralby--from a subsidiary of bne or more of the
Development Banks to an independent company with or without govern-
mental shareholding from one or more African countries. The services
offered by such a firm would include general, that is overall,
manageral responsibility for project implementation in technical
fields. It would have to have staff trained and experienced in
business administration, law, accounting, and specific engineering
fields. Its own permanent staff would most likely best be general-
ists, for the most part, with more specialized people and subcon-
tractors brought in as needed. The firm would have the same full
responsibility for proper project performance that the interna-
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tional firms have--to coordinate the activities of subcontractors
and consultants, to handle suppliers, to carry out financial con-
trol and contract compliance operations, to assure quality con-
trol and the satisfaction of all legal requirements. In time
such a firm may build up its own direct construction and/or other
engineering capabilities if it is unable to start out with such.
The firm could enter into partnership arrangements with interna-
tional firms to fill out its capability, but the objective would
be to develop its own capabili-ties as broadly as it can competitive-
ly do so.
The advantage that such a firm would have over the existing
situation derives not only from the value of having indigenous
institutions directly in control of project implementation that
are not bound to the constraints inherrent in government bureaucra-
cies. Such a firm would also be appealing to African technicians
who are already trained and experienced , or those currently- being
trained, who would find it more attractive to work in an institu-
tion that operates in many localities, and that is not so subject
to local political pressures,as the government and parastatal
positions often are.
The role of the ABEDA and other development finance institutions
would be: 1) determine the market potential for such a firm, 2)iden-
tify existing firms and communicate to them the opportunities afford-
ed by their combination in this fashion, 3) provide the necessary
working capital to get them started, and 4) provide the initial
market they need.
In any case, these institutions should begin to take seriously
the need to build up indigenous project implementation capacities.
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